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ABSTRACT
One prominent factor associated with accepting science as factual includes
religiosity, with greater espoused religiosity often associated with less acceptance of
scientific facts and greater secularism associated with greater acceptance of science as
factual, but often reduced respect of religious beliefs. Such dichotomies exacerbate
perceptions that science and religion are mutually exclusive, thereby fostering conflict
between individuals with different perspectives and increasing ideological polarization.
The current study sought to compare these mutually exclusive articulations of science and
religion to a mutualist articulation of science and religion as complementary ways of
knowing. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four condition vignettes: a
portrayal of science as superior to religion in terms of generating “true” knowledge,
religion as superior to science in terms of generating “true” knowledge, a mutualistic
perspective indicating that science and religion complement each other and are valuable
ways of learning truth more broadly, or an unrelated control condition. Participants then
rated the extent to which they agreed that certain scientific facts were true and their
respect for commonly held religious beliefs, followed by a measure assessing their
general belief in science versus religion. This was followed by an assessment of their
perception of vignette authors’ expertise, their own political orientation, and self-reported
religiosity, with the former two variables’ influence accounted for in omnibus models.
Consistent with previous research, more religious individuals reported lower endorsement
of scientific facts. When testing levels of religious respect, more conservative individuals,
as well as those reporting higher levels of religiosity, reported higher levels of respect for
religious practices. Consistent with hypotheses, participants low in religiosity within the
ii

mutuality condition reported greater respect for religious practices compared to all other
conditions. Partially supporting reactance hypotheses, low religiosity individuals exposed
to the religion-superiority condition expressed greater belief in science compared to the
mutuality condition, reflecting potential defensive reactance. These results highlight
mutuality as an effective strategy to increase secular individuals’ respect for religion;
however, high religiosity persons were un-swayed by this mutualistic articulation of
science and religion.
Keywords: Religiosity, Science Beliefs, Mutuality, Defensive Reactivity, Confirmation
Bias
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
One significant challenge facing the scientific community today is decreasing
trust in the enterprise of science and declining belief in scientific findings as fact by the
public (Rutjens, Heine, Sutton, & van Harreveld, 2018; Tsipursky, 2018). The
consequences of declining trust in science are notable, and include trends such as repeal
of policies and participation in multi-national agreements to counter climate change
through reduced carbon emissions and support for alternative energy sources, as well as
anti-vaccination movements that have resulted in the resurgence of previously eradicated
diseases, such as measles (Hackett, 2019). Historically, society has benefited from
“buying” into the work of scientists and the recommendations from the outcomes of
scientific research, which include a litany of social, technological, and medical
developments that have improved outcomes and opportunities for people in society
(Maqbool, Bahadar, & Abdollahi, 2014). However, when public trust in science declines,
the ability of science to provide social beneficence is impeded, and this ultimately results
in negative outcomes for society and its individual members.
As a consequence of recent trends, the scientific community has become
increasingly interested in understanding the factors contributing to reduced acceptance of
scientific evidence, primarily as means of identifying strategies to effectively enhance
public trust in science. The increase in science denial has co-evolved with another
society-wide phenomenon; increased access to information (Lewandowsky, Mann,
Brown, & Friedman, 2016). This increased informational access would be expected to
result in an increase trust in science as greater informational awareness often reduces
unwarranted skepticism. However, it would appear that a decrease in trust of scientific
1

information has resulted instead (Tsipursky, 2018). In explaining this inverse relationship
between information availability and public trust in science, it may be that access to vast
quantities of unfiltered information itself might be part of the problem (Andrejevic, 2013;
Malhotra, 1984; Marchi, 2012). While the ability to communicate so broadly can
positively impact understanding of other cultures and ideas, it can be hard to navigate the
rapid influx of information to the point where individuals may not be able to differentiate
truth from falsehood (Allcott & Gentzow, 2017). When flooded by information, with no
way to appropriately filter through it, individuals may take the less costly cognitive route
by simply accepting information that confirms, or is consistent with, their own world
view.
Another way that individuals may reduce the overwhelming amount of
information is to trust information based on its source. Specifically, individuals may look
to people they consider to be experts and base their own opinion on the expert’s. Indeed,
perceived expertise has been shown to be related to attitudes regarding various types of
information (Cairney & Wellstead, 2020; Stecula, Kuru, & Jamieson, 2020; Tokushige,
Akimoto, Tomoda, 2007). Examples of this can be seen in the evolving definition of
“expert”, which has begun to include individuals that the public considers to have high
levels of expertise in a particular topic, despite these individuals having no qualifications
relating to that topic. For example, peoples’ trust in conspiracy theories created by
“experts”, though derived from non-scientific information, are able to influence peoples’
attitudes towards many types of information (Chen, Zhang, Young, Wu, & Zhu, 2020).
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Confirmation Bias and Reactance
Confirmation bias, defined as the tendency for people to consider only
information that supports their current worldview as being accurate, influences peoples’
information processing (Wason, 1960). Specifically, confirmation bias is a heuristic with
the purpose of efficiently, rather than carefully, processing information. When exposed to
information that contradicts (threatens) their world view, individuals tend to develop a
more negative attitude toward the contradictory information and double down on their
beliefs, whether or not they are accurate (e.g., disconfirmation of incompatible
information). For example, previous research has found that participants were more likely
to evaluate a hypothesis with implications contrary to their own self-concepts as less
valid (reactance due to confirmation bias) than participants who did not evaluate a
threatening hypothesis (Munro & Stansbury, 2009).
Subsequent research examined methods for reducing confirmation bias in
participants. Specifically, one study suggested that when given information in a disfluent
format (e.g., in a strange or difficult-to-read font), participants were forced to spend more
time processing the information (Hernandez & Preston, 2012). This resulted in a decrease
in confirmation bias when participants were processing information inconsistent with
their world view. The authors suggest that the greater time required to process the
threatening information resulted in a more detailed and analytical processing of that
information, removing participants’ ability to simply disregard it despite its
disconfirmatory nature (Hernandez & Preston, 2012).
Research on reactive responses and confirmation bias demonstrate how
information delivered in a non-compromising fashion, with a vested interest (e.g.,
3

“religion is useless”), rather than in a more open way suggesting the availability of
alternatives (e.g., “religion may not be helpful in this context, but it can be useful here”),
is more likely to receive a reactionary response from the partner in the interaction
(Brehm, 1966; Steindl, Jonas, Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch, & Greenberg, 2015). For
example, participants tasked with engaging in a hypothetical doctor-patient interaction
were found to react with mistrust and confirmation bias, particularly the patients, with
their interaction partner when given a forced medication (e.g., when the doctor pursued a
personal interest at the patient’s expense; Steindl & Jonas, 2015). This style of interaction
resulted in greater patient reactivity which, in turn, resulted in more frequent subtle
displays of reactivity and confirmation bias from the doctors, who would then search for
information that supported their forced medication preference. Additionally, the
aggressive behavior intentions of the participants increased in the forced medication
condition.
These findings suggest that polarization can result from absolutist language (or
decisions) that neither acknowledges nor validates inconsistent information, as is seen in
the derogation of science by some religious extremists as well as the derogation of
religion by atheist extremists. In reaction to this absolutism, polarization between groups
increases, along with confirmation biases and intention to engage in aggressive behaviors
towards members of the other group. These aggressive reactions can range from fiery
arguments online to public protests that can turn violent without offering any real
solution to the polarization that motivated the protest behavior in the first place.
Confirmation biases can also manifest in other dangerous ways, such as religious denial

4

of the benefits of medical advancements (e.g., religious exemptions to vaccination;
Committee on Bioethics, 1997).
Individual Difference Factors Influencing Scientific Belief
Previous research has found that individual difference factors, such as individual
ideologies, are related to individuals’ attitudes towards scientific information (e.g.,
Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). For example, political orientation has been found
to be related to self-reported belief in scientific findings, with politically conservative
individuals reporting greater disagreement with science compared to more liberal
individuals (Gauchat, 2012; McCright, 2011; Medlin, Sacco, & Brown, 2019). Indeed,
increased propagation of misinformation has already been demonstrated by political
conservatives during major societal events (i.e., the 2016 U.S. presidential election;
Allcott & Gentzow, 2017; Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016).
These political differences in science belief suggest that there might be
differences in information processing between individuals of varying political
orientations (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). Individuals more liberal in
orientation may approach new information openly, as liberals tend to be higher in the
personality trait of openness to experience compared to conservative individuals, which
can result in greater trust of scientific findings, particularly those findings that may run
counter to one’s previously held beliefs (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008).
However, such openness, though it buffers against maladaptive skepticism, also renders
liberals more vulnerable to misinformation especially when it is expressed to impress
rather than convey truthful information (Medlin et al., 2019; Nilsson, Erlandsson, &
Västfjäll, 2019). Conversely, conservative individuals may avoid such information in
5

favor of information that aligns with their beliefs and avoidance of disconfirmatory
information (Jost, 2006; Leone & Chirumbolo, 2012; Nilsson, Erlandsson, &Västfjäll,
2019; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwarz, & Knfao, 2002).
Religious attitudes towards science
More pertinent to the current study, religious belief is another factor that can
influence an individual’s attitudes towards science (Evans & Hudson, 2007; Parrott, Silk,
Krieger, Harris, & Condit, 2004). While highly religious individuals are more likely to be
politically conservative, not all conservatives are religious (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015).
Therefore, religiosity as a psychological construct has unique features, independent of
any shared variance with political ideology, and thus is distinct enough to be considered a
unique individual difference characteristic (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015).
There are many aspects of science that religious individuals are particularly
averse to, such as evolutionary research and controversial medical advancements (e.g.,
abortion, cloning, and stem cell research; Bainbridge, 2003; McPhetres & Zuckerman,
2018; Nisbet, 2005). Indeed, it has been argued that religious persons are highly opposed
to science in specific domains where they believe scientists are tampering with God’s
domain (e.g., creating life; Bainbridge, 2003) and that there are certain metaphysical
questions that science is not qualified to answer (e.g., origins of human life, when a life
begins). Disagreements regarding scientific research areas could occur when religious
individuals feel that scientists are making claims that go beyond the realm of science
(e.g., metaphysical topics; McPhetres & Nyugen, 2017). This is particularly common
when a small subset of unqualified individuals claiming to be scientists say that science is
able to prove religion wrong (Francis, Astley, & McKenna, 2019). To claim that science
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can establish that religion is wrong reflects an inaccurate understanding of the scientific
method, as such a position is currently not falsifiable, which is a critical requirement for
sound scientific research (Ding, 2002; Popper, 1963). The resulting distrust of absolutist
scientists may then be more easily generalized to science more broadly, fostering
reactance and dismissal of the scientific enterprise, including science with socially
beneficial results (e.g., effectiveness of vaccinations).
Defensive Reactivity
Events that call personally held beliefs into question, prompting feelings of
uncertainty, result in utilization of uncertainty reduction techniques including defensive
reactivity McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Nash, McGregor, & Prentice,
2011; Wichman, 2010). Defensive reactivity refers to the tendency of an individual to
react with negative emotions to a perceived threat. This may be a physical threat or a
figurative threat, such as a threat to an individual’s worldview. An individual’s reactivity
to perceived threat often leads to strengthened belief in personally relevant information
and values (e.g., attitudes towards abortion and gun control; Lewandowsky et al., 2016;
McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001).
These types of defensive responses have been documented with respect to
scientists and religious individuals in social and news media, each of which are reacting
in a self-defensive manner against what they consider to be systematic threats posed by
inferior outside parties intent on undermining their worldview or way of knowing (i.e.,
the other sides’ faulty belief system; Howell, 2019). With the vastness of the internet, it is
possible to make unfounded claims with anonymity, removing the burden of proof or
responsibility. Technological advances in social media have given individuals the ability
7

to say whatever they want, whether it is factual or not, without any repercussions. With
this lack of personal responsibility, defensive reactivity over social media has increased
(Xia, 2013). Emotionally charged Facebook rants, news channels sensationalizing
disagreements between polarized groups (e.g., religion and science) with data “backed
up” by scientist-administrated polls, and falsified data making medical claims not
supported by the medical and scientific community are all formats in which
misinformation can be widely spread, leading to the potential acceptance of inaccurate,
dangerous beliefs (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Marchi, 2012).
Interestingly, Pew Research Polls on religious trends show a noticeable decline in
self-identified religiosity and participation in religion in the US (Pew Research Forum,
2015; 2018; 2019). Religious extremists’ demonizing of scientific research could be
contributing to this, as well as their assertion that religion supersedes science. Another
reason for this decline may involve religious reactionary aggression towards scientific
research related specifically to women’s rights, resulting in a denial of those rights (e.g.,
the right to an abortion; O’Brien & Noy, 2015). This decline in self-reported religiosity
suggests that there is a rapidly growing contingent in the U.S. that feels uncomfortable
with the rigidity inherent in traditional religiosity (Djupe, Neiheisel, & Conger, 2018).
Perceptions of religion as unduly rigid (conservativism/dogmatism) have also
been on the rise in Europe, as it steadily becomes more secularized. Non-religious
individuals in Belgium, for example, reported that religious individuals were more likely
to attribute negative traits to them compared to religious individuals’ actual attitudes
(stereotypes) towards non-religious individuals (Saroglou, Yzerbyt, & Kaschten, 2011). It
is likely that this perceived hostility from religious individuals also increased in-group
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bias within non-religious individuals, which was significantly higher than it was for
religious individuals. Additionally, non-religious individuals’ evaluations of religious
individuals were significantly lower than religious individuals’ evaluations of nonreligious individuals.
This evaluation of religious people as more judgmental than they actually are may
be related to increased rates of reactive hostility from non-religious/atheist individuals
that manifest on social platforms where they decry religious “anti-science” attitudes. One
post in particular, written by an ecological and evolutionary scientist, denounced
religious faith as a defect while arguing that religion and science are, by definition,
irreconcilable (Coyne, 2018). Religion and science, while different methods of perceiving
the world, both still serve valuable functions within human society. The dramatic derision
from the fanatically religious and skeptical do not consider the benefits the other side has
to offer, resulting in attitudes of invalidation and rejection from both sides.
Further, the tendency for media outlets to speak about topics related to science
and religion in biased ways further sensationalize the issues, encouraging arguments
between the two increasingly polarized groups (Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers,
Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2014). Additionally, the anonymity afforded by internet
platforms makes people feel comfortable to react rudely to an individual’s differing
viewpoint, degrading conversations into petty arguments, further polarizing the two sides
(Holt, 2016).
The consequence of this spread is an ever-increasing polarization between the
religious and scientific communities, similar to that seen in the participants, doctors and
patients, in Steindl and Jonas’ (2015) study. Recent political policies serve as an example
9

of this growing fissure between science and religion. For example, the dramatic budget
cuts for the Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) proposed by Trump, a former
president who touted religious morals, demonstrates the lack of acknowledgment of the
large body of scientific research showing the need for greater concern regarding the
climate change crisis by the Trump administration and their constituents (Thrush &
Davenport, 2017).
Not only did the Trump administration basically deny climate change as being a
serious issue, they removed scientific data regarding climate change issues from websites
and governmental databases (Diamond, 2020; Rainey & Rainey, 2017). This dismissal of
scientific evidence has resulted in defensive reactions from supporters of scientific
research who protested against the Trump administrations’ anti-science platform (Fisher
& Frickel, 2018). Compromise between the scientific and religious camps is critical if the
public is to continue to benefit from both scientific discoveries and social institutions
intended to foster meaning and social support, the latter often facilitated by participation
in religious and spiritual communities.
Mutuality as a Counter to Polarization
In an increasingly polarized climate, pitting religion and science as purely
oppositional, it is imperative to work towards a compromise between scientific
foundations and the members of the majority religion in the US; Christians. This research
proposes a method by which to introduce a compromise by educating both secular and
religious individuals about the mutualistic nature of science and religion. Indeed, much
past research suggests that mutuality can foster greater acceptance of differing views and
respect for those views even when adoption of those views is not necessarily possible.
10

Mutuality has been found to be beneficial in both cultural and interpersonal
contexts (Curseu, Schruijer, & Fodor, 2017; Horenczyk, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Sam, &
Vedder, 2013). For instance, within the context of acculturation, which is when members
of one culture integrate into another culture as a cultural minority, a minority group takes
on some of the social norms of the culture into which they are integrating (Horenczyk et
al., 2013). In turn, the majority is more likely to accept cultural deviations within the
minority culture, such as a different major religion, hierarchy, etc., provided they do not
violate the major beliefs of the dominant culture.
Additionally, mutuality has been found to be beneficial on the individual level
(Lester, Goodloe, Johnson, & Deutsch, 2018). The emphasis of mutuality on interest in
engaging with others, as well as experiential empathy, has made it very effective in youth
mentoring programs as well as in couples therapy. Within mentor-mentee programs,
mutuality is promoted between the mentor and mentee by enhancing an interest in
investing in the relationship as well as normalizing the mentee’s experience through the
mentor’s sharing of common experiences.
Taken together, past research suggests that mutuality has the ability to close gaps
between peoples of differing values and attitudes on both individual and cultural levels.
Not only has it been effective in fostering understanding between individuals of diverse
cultural backgrounds, as well as mentor-mentee programs, mutuality has also been
effective in therapeutic settings between couples and therapists (Skerrett, 1996).
Critically, mutuality is effective because it closes the initial gap between two perspectives
by fostering changes in both perspectives, rather than unilaterally requiring change from
only one party (Curseu et al., 2017). In essence, this is a critical dimension of mutuality
11

because one side is not asked to endure more of the burden associated with compromise
than the other. Furthermore, both parties may be more likely to be exposed to validation
of an opposing belief system by a potentially respected in-group member (e.g., majority
leaders demonstrating respect for, and commonality - social cohesion - with, minority
groups; Glasford & Johnston, 2017). Being exposed to an in-group member espousing
respect for an out-group member’s worldview can be a means of fostering greater respect
for this oppositional position (also seen in racial discrimination and learning research,
e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Curseu et al., 2017).
Given the positive impact mutuality has been shown to have on group
cohesiveness, I expected that leveraging mutuality in the context of two seemingly
oppositional ways of knowing, specifically science and religion, with largely separate
populations of individuals, may lead to positive attitudinal changes in both groups. I
utilized mutuality to emphasize the areas in which scientists are qualified to serve as
experts, the areas where religion offers valuable input, and communicate that both can
accomplish their goals in a non-competitive, mutually beneficial way. Both parties need
to recognize the limitations of what science and religion can answer while respecting the
unique information that each can produce. In essence, such mutualism should promote 1)
appreciation for the unique insights provided by both epistemologies, 2) appreciation for
the limitations of both epistemologies, and 3) awareness of the benefits of valuing and
respecting both ways of knowing the world and attempting to obtain truth.
Current Research
The purpose of the current research was to determine the effectiveness of
mutualistic exposure aimed at improving religious persons’ acceptance of science
12

towards valid scientific research while also fostering respect for religious practices
amongst secular persons who may feel that believing in god serves no function.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four informational conditions manipulated
via exposure to different vignettes: a condition in which science is communicated as
superior to religion in terms of generating factual information, a condition in which
religion is superior to science in generating factual information, a science-and-religionare-complimentary condition (i.e., each is a valuable way of knowing that uniquely and
collaboratively produce valued ways of understanding truth), or an unrelated control
vignette, added to test the effectiveness of participants’ exposure to mutuality.
Participants were asked to read each vignette carefully, as they would be asked a question
about it once they finished. Participants then completed assessments of vignette authors’
expertise, belief in scientific facts, respect for religious beliefs, self-reported religiosity,
perceived expertise of vignette authors, and political orientation. Given past research
showing a modest correlation between religiosity and political orientation as well as the
possibility that perceived expertise may vary as a function of how consistent the vignette
perspective is with one’s own personal beliefs (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015; Frimer,
Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014), these two variables were included in the omnibus model as
control variables to determine the independent impact of self-reported religiosity and
vignette condition on dependent measures in order to test core study hypotheses. In
addition, affective measures for fear and hostility were included within analyses to
determine whether or not aggressive reactivity was related to participants’ affective
states.
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It was predicted that religiosity would interact with communication type (e.g.,
religious individuals would react negatively to the science as superior condition). For
individuals reporting higher levels of religious belief, the science is superior condition
would lead to especially high skepticism of science (reactance) and particularly strong
support of religious belief, with the religion as superior condition showing a similar,
though less intense, pattern. The mutuality condition was not expected to differ in support
for religion compared to the religion is superior condition, but would result in greater
belief in scientific facts than the other three conditions for individuals high in religiosity.
Additionally, individuals high in religiosity within the control condition were expected to
report higher levels of fact belief compared to the science is superior and religion is
superior conditions, but lower fact belief compared to the mutuality condition. For
individuals reporting lower levels of religious belief, the religion is superior condition
was expected to lead to increased disrespect towards religious belief (reactance) and
particularly strong support of science, with the science is superior condition showing a
similar, though slightly weaker, pattern. The mutuality condition, again, will not differ in
support for science compared to the science as superior condition, but will result in
greater respect for religion than the other three conditions for individuals low in
religiosity (high in secularism). Additionally, individuals reporting lower levels of
religiosity within the control condition were expected to report higher levels of religious
respect compared to the science is superior and religion is superior conditions, but lower
religious respect compared to the mutuality condition.
Given that the control condition did not contain information regarding either
religion or science viewpoints, participants’ support for science in this condition was
14

expected to be higher than in the religion is superior condition but lower than in the
mutuality and science as superior conditions. Finally, control condition participants’
belief in religion was expected to be lower than in the religion as superior condition but
higher than in the science as superior and mutuality conditions.
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CHAPTER II - METHODS
Study Design
The design utilized in this study included one between-factor variable with four
levels; Science as superior, Religion as superior, the Mutuality condition, and a control
condition. Primary dependent measures included personal acceptance of a series of
known scientific facts, respect for a series of common religious beliefs and practices,
belief in science, and belief in religion.
Participants
Participants were recruited from a mid-sized public university in Southeastern
U.S. participated for course credit. A small-medium effect-size power analysis (Cohen’s
f=0.20, β=0.80) indicated that 244 participants would sufficiently detect effects. I
deliberately oversampled by 10% to account for attrition. The final sample size consisted
of 272 participants, after excluding two for incomplete responses (235 Women, 35 Men,
2 “Other”; Mage=21.01, SDage=5.99; 178 White, 75 Black, 6 Hispanic or Latino, 5 Asian,
8 “Other”).
Materials
Attitudinal Manipulation. Dependent upon condition, participants read one of four
vignettes; one discussing the superiority of science, one discussing the superiority of
religion, one discussing science and religion as compatible belief systems, and one
control vignette discussing pizza toppings (see Appendix A). These vignettes were
presented to participants as articles posted on The Washington Post’s website, with each
article being assigned a pair of authors, each holding a specific title suggesting expertise
in one of the areas of interest (“Dr.” for the science vignette, “Rev” for the religion
16

vignette, a combination of the two within the mutuality vignette, and no title for the
control vignette). Additionally, each vignette was counter-balanced with name, to ensure
that there was no effect of author name on participants’ responses (common male names
were used). Due to a lack of validated materials for this specific manipulation, I wrote all
of the conditional vignettes for this study.
Expertise. Participants indicated the level of expertise they attributed to the
authors of the vignettes using a single item measure (“What level of expertise would you
rate the authors of the article as having?”; 1=No Expertise; 7=The Writers are Experts)
created by myself.
Belief in Scientific Facts. Participants rated their agreement with 10 empirically
supported scientific statements (see Appendix B) using a 7-point Likert-type scale (total
α=0.67; 1=Not at All; 7=Completely). Items were gathered by the authors from various
sources based on the public availability of the information and were divided into facts
considered to be uncomfortable (5 items; α=0.64) or comfortable (5 items; α=0.57). Due
to the low reliability of these fact items, they were averaged to create a measure of
overall fact endorsement1. One of my previous studies found similarly low reliabilities
and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was run on the fact items, with no meaningful
factor structure returned (Medlin, Sacco, & Brown, 2019)2.

1

When fact comfortability was included as a within subjects factor, the only effect to emerge was a
comfortability by religiosity interaction, such higher religiosity predicted less disbelief in comfortable
compared to uncomfortable facts. As such, this variable is not discussed further.
2
The EFA yielded two factors explaining about 40.91% of the variance. The first factor included the
uncomfortable fact items and accounted for approximately 26% of the variance. The second factor included
the comfortable fact items and accounted for approximately 15% of the variance. KMO was adequate, as
evident by its non-significance (p=0.728) and Bartlett’s test indicated no violation of sphericity, χ²(45,
N=272)=342.395, p<0.001.
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Religious Respect. Participants also rated their level of respect for general
religious practices (i.e., praying daily) by completing a 10 item, 4-point Likert-type scale
(1=Strongly Disagree; 4=Strongly Agree), modified version of the Santa Clara Strength
of Religious Faith questionnaire (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). This scale was modified to
measure participants’ respect for an individual who engages in these religious practices,
rather than measuring the participants’ own engagement in those practices, since no
measure of respect for religious practices exists (see Appendix C). To avoid a loss of
scale reliability, I kept the original anchors and calculated the reliability to compare with
the Santa Clara itself (modified scale reliability α=0.97; original scale reliability α=0.95).
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Fear and Hostility. Participants were
asked to rate the number of times in a week that they felt emotions related to fear and
hostility (e.g., anger, fear) using the fear (6 items; α=0.87) and hostility (6 items; α=0.79)
subscales of the PANAS-X, using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Slightly or Not At
All; 5=Extremely) (total α=0.86; Watson & Lee, 1994) (see Appendix D).
Belief in Science/Religion. In order to have equivalent measures of belief in
science and belief in religion, the Belief in Science scale was used (BIS α=0.91; Farias,
Newheiser, Kahane, & de Toledo, 2013). I modified the science items to create an
equivalent measure of belief in religion (BIR α=0.95). Participants were asked to indicate
their level of agreement with the 10 items of the Belief in Science and Belief in Religion
measures using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) (see
Appendix E).
General measure of religiosity. Participants rated their agreement with 5 items
making up a general religiosity measure using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=Strongly
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Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) (α=0.91; Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012) (see Appendix
F).
Political Affiliation. Participants indicated their general political orientation using
a face-valid, single-item 7-point Likert-type scale measure (1=Very Liberal; 7=Very
Conservative). Additionally, participants indicated their political orientation regarding
economic and social issues (fiscal and social political orientation), using two single-item
measures, each on a 9-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 9=Very Conservative)
(see Appendix G). Previous research demonstrates such single-item measures sufficiently
assess political affiliation. Given moderate associations between religiosity and political
conservatism (political affiliation, r(272)=0.49, p<0.001; social conservativism,
r(272)=0.46, p<0.001; fiscal conservativism, r(272)=0.45, p<0.001,) (e.g., Medlin et al.,
2019), and given the current study’s interest in religiosity more specifically, these three
political orientation measures were included as covariates in statistical models to isolate
the independent impact of religiosity. Given that both conceptually and empirically social
and fiscal conservatism predict different outcomes, these variables were included as
independent control variables, rather than averaged into a single covariate.
Procedure
This study was reviewed and approved by The University of Southern Mississippi
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix I). The study was then programmed into
Qualtrics for online data collection. Recruitment occurred through USM’s SONA
participation system, with the compensation for participation being course credit. After
obtaining informed consent (Appendix J), participants were randomly assigned into one
of the four conditions; the condition in which science was discussed as being superior to
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religion, the condition in which religion was discussed as being superior to science, the
condition in which science and religion were presented as complementary, with science
and religion both being described as having valuable, though different, functions, and the
control condition.
Participants were instructed to read the vignette, presented as an opinion article on
The Washington Post website, carefully, as they would be asked a question about it once
they finished. They were given two minutes to read the article before being able to move
forward in the study, to ensure they did not click straight through within reading. Earlier
testing indicated that this was ample time for participants to fully read and comprehend
the article. Following this, participants were asked to indicate what they thought the
article’s authors’ expertise to be before completing all dependent and individual
differences measures in a randomized order. At the end of the study, participants filled
out a demographics form and were then redirected to a new window where they were
able to read the debriefing form page (see Appendix K) and were thanked for their
participation.
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CHAPTER III - RESULTS
Analyses
Primary Analyses
To test core predictions that self-reported religiosity and vignette condition would
interact to influence acceptance of scientific facts, respect for religion, and general belief
in science versus religion, independent of political orientation and perceptions of vignette
author expertise, custom ANCOVAs were utilized, with condition as a between subject
IV, religiosity as a continuous predictor variable, and expertise, political affiliation, social
political orientation, and fiscal political orientation as control variables3,4. Dependent
variables included overall scientific fact endorsement, respect for religious practices, and
the equivalent belief in science and belief in religion scales. Custom ANCOVAs allow
main effect and interaction analyses among combinations of categorical and continuous
variables, and are similar to regression models.
Fact Endorsement model. Within the fact endorsement model, a main effect of
religiosity was found, F(1, 271)=15.185, p<.001, η2=.055. A negative correlation
indicated that more highly religious individuals were less likely to endorse facts, r(266)=0.24, p<0.001, consistent with previous research (Medlin et al., 2019). No additional
significant effects emerged in this model (ps>.25).
Respect for Religious Practices model. Within the respect for religious practices
model, main effects of condition, F(3, 269)=4.563, p=.004, η2=.050, and religiosity, F(1,

3

Political affiliation and social conservativism were found to be related to the dependent variables, while
fiscal conservativism was unrelated. Social conservativism predicted lower belief in science [r(267)=-.028,
p=.011] and more conservative political affiliation predicted higher religious respect [r(267)=.173, p=.004].
4
The primary findings of this research held in models with and without accounting for expertise and the
political orientation measures.
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271)=50.080, p<.001, η2=.162, were found. Contrary to hypotheses, LSD tests indicated
that there were no significant differences in respect between conditions (ps>.07), though
there was a marginal difference found between the mutuality and control conditions
(p=.075). This suggests that individuals within the mutuality condition reported
marginally higher respect for religious practices than individuals within the control
condition, providing only weak support for study predictions. Additionally, consistent
with past research, the main effect of religiosity was such that those higher in religiosity
reported greater respect of religious practices, r(266)=0.39, p<0.001. Importantly and
consistent with core study hypotheses, these main effects were subsumed within a
significant condition by religiosity interaction, F(3, 269) = 3.965, p=.009, ηp2=.044.
To decompose the interaction found above, a floodlight analyses was conducted.
Specifically, data were submitted to Model 1 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) using 5000
bootstraps. Floodlight analyses were used to allow for comparisons of marginal means
(i.e., the estimated condition means) at different levels of the mediator in each model. In
this model, condition was the predictor, respect for religious practices was the outcome,
expertise, political affiliation, social political orientation, and fiscal political orientation
were covariates, and religiosity was the mediator.
At low (-1 SD) religiosity, the mutuality condition predicted significantly higher
levels of respect for religion compared to all other conditions (ps<.043). Consistent with
hypotheses, this finding suggests that individuals low in religiosity respond positively to
the idea of science and religion being considered complementary, rather than mutually
exclusive. At mean religiosity, conditions did not significantly differ on level of respect
(all ps>.07). At high (+1 SD) religiosity, conditions did not significantly differ in level of
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respect (all ps>.23). Simple slopes analysis indicated that religiosity predicted increased
respect in all conditions (science, b=.13, p<.001, religion: b=.14, p<.001; control, b=.18,
p<.001) except the mutuality condition (p=.259) (see Figure 1). Thus, mutuality disrupts
the relationship between religiosity and respect for religion specifically by operating on
the attitudes of those low in self-reported religiosity.

Figure 1. Simple Slopes for Respect floodlight model.
Simple slopes analysis demonstrating the general increase in respect across different levels of religiosity.

Belief in Science and Belief in Religion models. Belief in science and belief in
religion, which were on the same scale, served as separate DVs within a multivariate
model. Within the belief in science model, a main effect of condition was found, F(3,
269)=3.362,p=.019, η2=.037. Inconsistent with hypotheses, LSD tests indicated that there
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were no significant pairwise differences in belief in science between conditions
(ps>.593). In addition, a main effect of religiosity was found within the belief in science
model, F(1, 271)=95.184, p<.001, η2=.268. Consistent with previous research, a negative
correlation indicated that more highly religious individuals reported lower belief in
science, r(71)=-0.52, p<.001. These results were qualified by a significant condition by
religiosity interaction, F(3,269)=3.786, p=.011, ηp2=.042. This interaction suggests the
main effect of condition above, which demonstrated no post-hoc conditional level
differences, was driven by individuals of specific levels of religiosity.
The interaction above was decomposed using floodlight analysis, with the same
predictor, covariates, and moderator as in the respect for religious practices floodlight
model. However, within this model, belief in science was the outcome variable. At low (1 SD) religiosity, the religion is superior condition was associated with significantly
higher levels of belief in science compared to the mutuality condition, b=0.63, SE=0.26,
t(260)=2.47, p=.014. This finding suggests that, when told that religion is superior to
science rather than being an equally valid method of understanding the world, individuals
low in religiosity demonstrate defensive reactance, becoming even more favorably
predisposed to science, which is consistent with study hypotheses. There was no
significant difference between the other conditions (ps>.10). At mean religiosity,
conditions did not significantly differ on level of belief in science (all ps>.59). At high
(+1 SD) religiosity, conditions did not significantly differ in belief in science (all
ps>.066). Simple slopes analysis indicated that religiosity predicted decreased belief in
science in all conditions (science, b=-.36, p<.001, religion: b=-.50, p<.001; mutuality:
b=-.20, p<.005; control, b=-.43, p<.001) (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Simple Slopes for Belief in Science floodlight model.
Simple slopes analysis demonstrating the general decrease in belief in science across different levels of religiosity.

Belief in Religion. Within the belief in religion model, a main effect of religiosity
was found, F(1, 271)=177.979, p<.001, η2=.406, with a positive correlation indicating
that participants higher in religiosity reported higher belief in religion, r(268)=.64,
p<.001, consistent with hypotheses. No other significant effects emerge within this model
(all ps>.50).
Fear and Hostility model. Within the fear and hostility model, no difference
across conditions was found (ps>.19), nor were there differences in fear or hostility
across levels of participant religiosity (ps>.41). As such, these variables were not
considered further.
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CHAPTER IV - DISCUSSION
Independent of condition, and consistent with past research, religiosity and
political orientation, both general and social conservatism but not fiscal conservatism,
predicted less support for science and more belief in religion (Medlin et al., 2019). The
mutuality condition led those low in religiosity to have more respect for religion, which
was consistent with hypotheses. When individuals reporting lower religiosity were told
that religion is superior compared to religion and science being equal, they reported
greater belief in science (predicted reactance), also supporting hypotheses. Consistent
with this latter finding, previous research, demonstrates that a lack of compromise tends
to result in one party reacting negatively against the party enforcing the non-negotiable
decision, even when there are no personal consequences for the person having the
decision made for them (doctor-patient study; Steindl & Jonas, 2015). This suggests that
the commonly seen inter-party political arguing may be more a result of the noncompromising attitude of the other side, rather than incongruous values, which further
suggests that the negative feelings between the two parties could be assuaged using a
mutualistic framework.
While low-religious individuals displayed the predicted defensive reactivity
within the religion as superior condition when compared to the mutuality condition, the
level of belief in science in the mutuality condition was the lowest out of all conditions.
Though this difference is only descriptive, it would be beneficial to design future studies
to manipulate mutuality in such a way that while respect is increased in individuals
reporting lower levels of religiosity, their levels of belief in science are not
simultaneously decreased.
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As mutuality descriptively decreased belief in science in low-religious
individuals, it did not make more highly religious persons more accepting of scientific
facts or make them believe in science more, contrary to hypotheses. Additionally, while
higher religiosity did predict both lower belief in science and lower fact endorsement,
these findings were not restricted to the science condition, as was predicted, but were
shown in all conditions. This finding demonstrates a general dismissal of science by
highly religious individuals, rather than reactive dismissal by religious participants due to
provocation, which is also not consistent with hypotheses. This may cause difficulty for
future attempts at trying to increase religious individuals’ acceptance of and belief in
science, given that their resistance may be more complex than simple reactionary
aggression towards antagonistic presentation of scientific information, and may also
include moral objections to scientific research (Bainbridge, 2003; McPhetres &
Zuckerman, 2018; Nisbet, 2005). This idea seems partially supported by the current
study, as religiosity predicted less acceptance of uncomfortable relative to comfortable
facts, though type of fact did not interact with the mutuality condition.
More religious person’s cognitive inflexibility could explain resistance to
mutualism documented in the current study. Given that viewing science and religion as
equally valuable ways of knowing is cognitively inconsistent with more religious
persons’ personally held view that religion is superior, and given religious individuals’
greater cognitive inflexibility in general, they may not be willing to cognitively engage
this alternative point of view which runs counter to their existing strongly held beliefs
(Zmigrod, Rentfrow, Zmigrod & Robbins, 2019). Given then that more religious
individuals’ attitudes towards science appear to be more nuanced, it might be possible to
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increase religious individuals’ acceptance of science that does not go against religious
moralities (e.g., medical research not involving stem cells or cloning).
The results of this study show that individuals reporting lower levels of religiosity
appear to be moved by mutuality, while highly religious individuals seem unresponsive
to the current study’s manipulation. This could be due in part to the fact that individuals
reporting lower religiosity are more likely to be politically liberal, and therefore, more
open to different experiences (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Rutjens, Sutton, &
van der Lee, 2018), thereby making it more likely that they would also be more open to
different perspectives.
With regards to fear and hostility, the manipulations did not influence measured
state affect, and thus the results seem to not be driven by changes in affect. This finding
is interesting, because it suggests that provoking people by invalidating a valued
worldview does not make them respond with greater affective hostility, but rather results
in defensive support for their own worldview, which may then make compromise
between the groups easier than previously expected. This assumption is based on the
neuro-evolutionary relation between reactive aggression and reduced cortical-subcortical
communication, resulting in failure to inhibit uncontrolled socially violent behaviors by
the relevant cortical regions (van Honk, Harmon-Jones, Morgan, & Schutter, 2010). If
these individuals are unable to control aggressive tendencies when confronted with
socially threatening information (worldview threat), any discussion regarding the
compromise of their worldview would more likely be met with hostility, rather than
reason.

28

Importantly, the core findings of this research held in models both accounting for
and not accounting for expertise and the political orientation measures, further suggesting
that effects of mutuality exist independent of expertise and political orientation. This
suggests that mutuality is indeed an effective method to reduce animosity between two
conflicting groups, if not improve the relationship between them, regardless of
perceptions of expertise or personal political orientation.
Limitations and Future Directions
Given the use of a preselected sample of university students, all from the
Southeastern United States, a highly religious region. The results may have been
influenced by participants with higher average levels of religiosity compared to other
regions within the US. Future research would benefit from recruiting nationwide, to
obtain a sample that better represents religiosity levels across the country. Additionally,
other regions may contain more variability in religious beliefs, making it possible that the
manipulation may be more impactful in these more varied areas. Alternatively, it is
possible that religiosity type (i.e., intrinsic versus extrinsic) may make a difference,
where individuals reporting more intrinsic religiosity may show more support for
scientific research than those reporting more extrinsic religiosity, due to the positive
relation between intrinsic religiosity and openness to experience (Saroglou, 2002).
Another possible area of religious variation may come from people who have a literal
versus historical-critical interpretation of the bible. Individuals reporting a more literal
interpretation may be less likely to support science, due to a negative relation between
scriptural literalism and science knowledge (Zigerell, 2010).
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In addition, our sample was comprised entirely of undergraduate college students.
I would expect that individuals with a higher level of education, such as masters’ and
doctoral students, would display stronger reactance when put in the condition counter to
their area of study (e.g., a PhD in biological sciences in the religion condition) (Barone,
Petto, & Campbell, 2014). As these individuals would be much more familiar with the
field than would undergraduates in the same area, I would expect that they would respond
more aggressively when being told that their area of expertise is inferior to another mode
of thinking. Therefore, further research could benefit from considering how differing
educational experiences, on top of other sociodemographic factors, could influence
individuals’ acceptance of science and respect for religious practices.
While the mutuality condition did show some of the hypothesized positive
changes in fact endorsement and religious respect, its effects were not as strong as
expected. Future research should examine methods to improve the effectiveness of
mutuality exposure in such a way that individuals reporting higher levels of religiosity
demonstrate increased fact endorsement and belief in science. This could be
accomplished by utilizing mutualistic communication to make scientific research more
salient to religious individuals, perhaps by referencing how improved medical technology
is able to help more people faster, appealing to the aspect of religiosity focused on
helping others in need.
The intention of the study was to explore the possibility of developing an
intervention aimed at increasing respect for religion as well as acceptance of empirically
supported scientific information utilizing mutualistic communication. While mutuality
was found to be partially effective, the current study was limited in the fact that it was
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cross-sectional. Thus, it is yet unknown if the manipulations in the current study could
be leveraged to produce meaningful changes in respect for religion and belief in science
that would be indicative of an effective intervention. Future research would benefit from
a pre-post or longitudinal design to assess the utility of the current epistemological
framings as an attitudinal intervention.
Additionally, the lack of an actual mutuality measure with the ability to assess
participants’ attitudes regarding the compatibility of religion and science was a notable
limitation of this study. Due to the limited literature discussing the utility of mutuality
outside of a therapeutic setting, such a measure does not yet seem to have been
developed. Such a measure would advance research on improving relations between
religious and non-religious persons by providing a method of assessing individual
perceptions of group compatibility, facilitating a deeper analysis of mutuality’s impact on
religious respect and scientific belief.
Another option could involve manipulating mutuality to show specific examples
of how science has helped religion, by showing that community-support from religion is
good for overall health and how religion has actually helped influencing science. For
example, the Hippocratic Oath that medical doctors take to ensure they help everyone
regardless of background is an example of how religious and spiritual philosophical
traditions have positively influenced science (Jotterand, 2005). By making mutuality
more concrete and demonstrating how religion has positively influenced important
aspects of science, people might be more likely to see science and religion as
fundamentally intertwined, thus extending some the value they place on religion to
science.
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Additionally, may be that more highly religious individuals would respond to
science more positively if they saw their religious leaders promoting scientific
acceptance. Individuals reporting higher levels of religiosity have been long known to
engage in authoritarianism; the enforcement of obedience to authority at the cost of
individual freedoms (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). If
highly religious individuals were to see their pastors, elders, or deacons promote
scientific knowledge, they may be more likely to also embrace science, given past
research showing group membership similarity between a communicator and their
audience is more effective at promoting audience attitude changed relative to group
membership dissimilarity (Mills & Jellison, 1968).
Conclusion
The current study sought to compare how mutually exclusive articulations of
science and religion versus a mutualist articulation of science and religion as
complementary ways of knowing influence acceptance of scientific facts and respect for
religious beliefs. Consistent with previous research, more religious individuals reported
overall lower endorsement of scientific facts. When testing levels of religious respect,
more conservative individuals, as well as those reporting higher levels of religiosity,
reported higher overall levels of respect for religious practices. Participants low in
religiosity within the mutuality condition reported greater respect for religious practices
compared to all other conditions. Additionally, low religiosity individuals exposed to the
religion-superiority condition expressed greater belief in science compared to the
mutuality condition. These results highlight mutuality as an effective strategy to increase
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secular individuals’ respect for religion; however, high religiosity persons are un-swayed
by this mutualistic articulation of science and religion.
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APPENDIX A - IRB Approval Letter
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APPENDIX B - Informed Consent

Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Project
Project Information
Project Title: Mutuality as a bridge between religion and science
Investigators: Mary Medlin, MS, Don Sacco, Ph.D.
Contact Information: Participants may contact Mary Medlin, MS, in the Department of
Psychology at the University of Southern Mississippi, or Don Sacco
(donald.sacco@usm.edu).
Purpose of Study
You are invited to take part in a research study conducted by Mary Medlin (advisor: Dr.
Don Sacco) in the Department of Psychology. Any questions or concerns regarding this
research may be directed to Dr. Sacco (Owings-McQuagge Hall; Room 220F; 601-2666747; Donald.sacco@usm.edu). This project and this consent form have been reviewed
by the Institutional Review Board, which ensures that research projects involving human
participants follow federal regulations. Any questions or concerns about your rights as a
research participant should be directed to the Chair of the Institutional Review Board,
The University of Southern Mississippi, Box 5116, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, (601) 2665997.
Description of Study
In this study you will be asked to review an essay as well as fill out some attitudinal
surveys. Additionally, you will be asked to provide some basic demographic information.
This study should take no longer than 30 minutes.
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Benefits
Your participation in this study does not guarantee any beneficial results. However, it
will aid in your understanding of how psychological research is conducted as well as
contribute to the general knowledge in the field.
Risks
The risks associated with participation in this study are not greater than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life, although you may feel mild emotional discomfort in various
stages of the experiment. If you feel that you are distressed at any time while
participating in this research, you should notify the researcher immediately. Furthermore,
for questions regarding topics of a sensitive nature, you can choose to skip those
questions and it will not impact your compensation for participating in this study.
Confidentiality
The responses that you provide today will be kept completely confidential. At no time
will your name or any other identifying information be associated with any of the data
that you generate today. It will never be possible to identify you personally in any report
of this research. Within these restrictions, results of the study will be made available to
you upon request.
Alternative Procedures
You are free to discontinue your participation in this study at any time without penalty or
loss of benefits. You may also freely decline to answer any of the questions asked of
you.
Participant's Assurance
This project has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board, which ensures that
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research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations.
Any questions of concerns about rights as a research participant should be directed to the
Chair of the IRB at 601-266-5997. Participation in this project is completely voluntary,
and participants may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty, prejudice, or
loss of benefits.
Any questions about the research should be directed to the Principle Investigator using
the contact information provided in the Project Information section above.
Consent to Participate
Consent is hereby given to participate in this research project. All procedures and/or
investigations to be followed and their purpose, including any experimental procedures,
were explained to me. Information was given about all benefits, risks, inconveniences, or
discomforts that might be expected.
The opportunity to ask questions regarding the research and procedures was given.
Participation in the project is completely voluntary, and participants may withdraw at any
time without penalty, prejudice, or loss of benefits. All personal information is strictly
confidential, and no names will be disclosed. Any new information that develops during
the project will be provided if that information mat affect the willingness to continue
participation in the project.
Questions concerning the research, at any time during or after the project, should be
directed to the Principle Investigator with the contact information provided above. This
project and this consent form have been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board,
which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations.
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research participant should be directed to the
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Chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118
College Drive #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001, (601) 226-5997.
If you consent to these procedures, please click the button labeled "I consent" below and
continue.
If not, select "I do not consent".
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APPENDIX C - Attitudinal Manipulations
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APPENDIX D - Fact Items

1. The brain regenerates brain cells (Martino et al., 2007). C
2. Humans are responsible for climate change (Hughes et al., 2003). C
3. Some sea turtles display bioluminescence (They can glow) (Gruber & Sparks, 2015). C
4. Scientists are now capable of taking pictures of black holes (Loff, 2019). C
5. Doctors can perform successful face transplants (Barret et al., 2011). C
6. Humans evolved through natural selection (Darwin, 1859). U
7. Humans and dinosaurs did not coexist (Cloninger, 2009). U
8. The use of human stem cells has been beneficial for society (Onda et al., 2008). U
9. Prophesies and divine communication are symptoms of schizophrenia (Murray,
Cunningham, & Price). U
10. Human behavior is driven by evolved basic needs, not free will (Darwin, 1859). U
________________________________________________________________________
Note. 7-point likert, 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely); U = Uncomfortable, C =
Comfortable.
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APPENDIX E - Respect for Religious Practices

Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire - Modified
Please answer the following questions about religious practices using the scale below.
Indicate your agreement with the following statements.
1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = agree 4 =strongly agree

1. I respect people whose religious faith is important to them.
2. I respect people who pray daily.
3. I respect people who look to their faith as a source of inspiration.
4. I respect people who look to their faith as providing meaning and purpose in their life.
5. I respect people who consider themselves active in their faith or church.
6. I respect people for whom faith is an important part of who they are as a person.
7. I respect people for whom a relationship with God is extremely important to them.
8. I respect people who enjoy being around others who share their faith.
9. I respect people who look to their faith as a source of comfort.
10. I respect people whose faith impacts many of their decisions
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APPENDIX F - PANAS-X

PANAS - fear and hostility subscales
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word. Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past few weeks. Use the
following scale to record your answers:
1
very slightly
or not at all

2

3

4

5

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

______ Afraid

______ Scared

______ Frightened

______ Nervous

______ Disgusted

______ Jittery

______ Shaky

______ Angry

______ Hostile

______ Irritable

______ Scornful

______ Loathing
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APPENDIX G - Belief in Science & Religion
Belief in science scale
1. Science provides us with a better understanding of the universe than does
religion.
2. In a demon-haunted world, science is a candle in the dark.
3. We can only rationally believe in what is scientifically provable.
4. Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of.
5. All the tasks human beings face are soluble by science.
6. The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge.
7. The only real kind of knowledge we can have is scientific knowledge.
8. Science is the most valuable part of human culture.
9. Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth.
10. Scientists and science should be given more respect in modern society.
Belief in religion scale
1. Religion provides us with a better understanding of the universe than does
science.
2. In a demon-haunted world, religion is a candle in the dark.
3. We can only rationally believe in what is said in religious texts.
4. Religion tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of.
5. All the tasks human beings face are soluble by religion.
6. Faith is the only reliable path to knowledge.
7. The only real kind of knowledge we can have is religious knowledge.
8. Religion is the most valuable part of human culture.
9. Religion is the most efficient means of attaining truth.
10. Spiritual leaders and religious belief should be given more respect in
modern society.
6-point Likert-type scale (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree)
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APPENDIX H - General Measure of Religiosity

Items
I consider myself to be a religious person
I consider myself to be a spiritual person
I am not religious (reverse scored)
I am a member of an organized religion
I regularly attend religious services
_______________________________________________________________________________
Note. 7-point scale.
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APPENDIX I - Political Affiliation Items

1. Specifically with regard to economic issues, and setting social issues aside, how would
you describe your political orientation?
9-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 9=Very Conservative)

2. Specifically with regard to social issues, and setting economic issues aside, how would
you describe your political orientation?
9-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 9=Very Conservative)

3. What is your political affiliation?
7-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 7=Very Conservative)
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APPENDIX J - Debriefing

Thank you for participating in this experiment! We hope you found the task an
interesting and enjoyable experience.
In this study, we were interested in whether the manner in which information is
presented would influence people’s acceptance of that information. Past literature
suggests that individual differences are related to acceptance of certain types of
information, as is the method of information presentation (e.g., political orientation;
Medlin et al., 2019). For example, when exposed to information that is presented in a
highly biased, maybe even confrontational, manner, individuals will react to it based on
their own views. If the information is inconsistent with their views, they are more likely
to react negatively to the information, making it less likely that they will accept it (e.g.,
religious extremists’ violent dismissal of scientific research). In fact, these individuals
will double down on their own view and dismiss anything that threatens it
(Lewandowsky et al., 2016; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). Based on this
defensive reaction, we hypothesized that information presented in a complimentary light
(e.g., that science and religion are both valuable) would reduce this reactivity and foster
increased mutual acceptance in both the scientific and religious camps.
Due to the on-going nature of this research, we would like to ask for your
cooperation in not revealing any details of this study to others (e.g. friends, classmates)
who might eventually participate in this study. These details could affect the way they
perform in this experiment, which would adversely affect the nature of our study. If
someone does ask, you can just tell them that you were asked to participate in a study
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about social attitudes, rather than providing specific details about the study. We did not
expect you to feel a great amount of discomfort in this study but the chance of feeling
that way was possible. If you felt any distress while writing about a time in your life, you
may benefit from counseling. Contact your health care provider for local mental health
agencies that may be able to help you.
If any part of this experiment has been traumatic for you in any way, please feel
free to inform the experimenter. If you have further questions, please contact the
experimenter listed on your consent form (Mary Medlin, ABD, mary.medlin@usm.edu).
Should you be interested in reading research related to this work, you can get
more information from:
Medlin, M. M., Sacco, D. F., & Brown, M. (2019). Political Orientation and Belief in
Science in a US College Sample. Psychological Reports, 0033294119889583.
Lewandowsky, S., Mann, M. E., Brown, N. J. L., & Friedman, H. (2016). Science and the
public: Debate, denial, and skepticism. Journal of Social and Political
Psychology, 4(2), 537–553. doi: 10.5964/jspp.v4i2.604
Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and
openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 65(5), 861-876.
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APPENDIX K - Descriptives Table
Descriptive Statistics
DV
Fear
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Condition
Science
Religion
Mutuality
Control
Hostility
Science
Religion
Mutuality
Control
Respect
Science
Religion
Mutuality
Control
Fact
Science
Religion
Mutuality
Control
Belief in Sci. Science
Religion
Mutuality
Control
Belief in Rel. Science
Religion
Mutuality
Control

Table 1. Descriptives Table.

N
75
66
64
67
75
66
64
67
75
66
64
67
75
66
64
67
75
66
64
67
75
66
64
67

Range
Minimum Maximum
3.50
1.00
4.50
3.00
1.00
4.00
4.00
1.00
5.00
3.80
1.00
4.80
3.17
1.00
4.17
2.17
1.00
3.17
2.33
1.00
3.33
2.33
1.00
3.33
2.20
1.80
4.00
3.00
1.00
4.00
1.10
2.90
4.00
1.90
2.10
4.00
4.10
2.40
6.50
4.60
1.90
6.50
4.20
2.60
6.80
3.90
2.30
6.20
5.00
1.20
6.20
5.70
1.00
6.70
4.20
1.40
5.60
5.60
1.30
6.90
5.70
1.00
6.70
6.00
1.00
7.00
6.00
1.00
7.00
5.90
1.00
6.90

Mean
2.3400
2.1086
2.2031
2.4015
1.9711
1.7475
1.7057
1.7985
3.5996
3.5788
3.7484
3.5746
4.6093
4.4106
4.5594
4.4612
3.7704
3.8621
3.5938
3.6866
3.7040
3.5621
4.2109
3.9748

Std.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Deviation Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
0.94933
0.511
0.277
-0.434
0.548
0.81728
0.292
0.295
-1.088
0.582
0.97837
0.629
0.299
-0.319
0.590
0.98802
0.416
0.293
-0.529
0.578
0.75555
0.951
0.277
0.388
0.548
0.59502
0.775
0.295
-0.481
0.582
0.67504
0.793
0.299
-0.305
0.590
0.65811
0.603
0.293
-0.528
0.578
0.51850
-1.217
0.277
1.145
0.548
0.56610
-2.022
0.295
5.795
0.582
0.38172
-1.250
0.299
-0.097
0.590
0.53153
-0.959
0.293
-0.235
0.578
0.80239
-0.315
0.277
0.146
0.548
0.96845
-0.323
0.295
-0.051
0.582
0.77249
0.013
0.299
1.070
0.590
0.84279
-0.251
0.293
0.041
0.578
1.11415
-0.230
0.277
-0.179
0.548
1.41245
0.019
0.295
-0.701
0.582
0.95500
-0.122
0.299
-0.455
0.590
1.27075
0.073
0.293
-0.614
0.578
1.43333
0.286
0.277
-0.484
0.548
1.67761
0.107
0.295
-0.904
0.582
1.32067
-0.317
0.299
-0.284
0.590
1.50637
0.057
0.293
-0.654
0.578

APPENDIX L - Correlation Table

Correlations
Fiscal
Conserv.
Political Affil.

**

.842

Fiscal Conserv.
Social Conserv.
Religiosity

Social
Conserv.
**

Religiosity
**

Fear

Hostility Respect
*

.842

.489

.767**

.447** -.126*
.460** -.165**
-0.031

-.146

Fear
Hostility
Respect
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Fact Comf.
Fact Uncomf.
Fact Endorse.
Belief in Sci.
Belief in Rel.

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2. Correlation Table.

Fact
Comf.

Fact
Uncomf.

Fact
Endorse.

Belief in
Sci.

Belief in
Rel.

Expertise

-.156

.355

-.136

-.325

-.292

-.357

.507

0.112

-.130*
-0.115

.307**
.284**

-.143*
-.125*

-.315**
-.323**

-.289**
-.284**

-.354**
-.326**

.455**
.511**

0.107

-0.116

.493**
-0.018

-.146*

-.406**
0.050

-.350**

-.598**
-0.043

.738**
-0.113

.165**
-0.084

0.019

-0.073

-0.074

**

**

**

.429**

**

-0.073

*

.178**
0.042
0.045

**

**

0.074

.139*
0.073

**

**

-.307

.285**

**

**

.119*

.786**

.204** -.203**

.150*
0.016

.816**

.520** -.479**

-0.093

-.171

-.458

**

.458

.494

**

-.431

-0.051

-.646**

-0.079
.290**
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